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IMPENDING "FRONTAL ASSAULT" ON THE
CITADEL: THE SUPREME COURT'S READINESS
TO MODIFY THE STRICT EXCLUSIONARY
RULE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO A GOOD FAITH STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
On the basis of two recent decisions, United States v. Janis' and
Stone v. Powell,2 the United States Supreme Court has signaled its
readiness to effect a substantial modification of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule enunciated in Weeks v. United Statess and extended
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.' This comment will focus on the import-
ant implications of these two decisions and their probable effects upon
the exclusionary rule. To facilitate this analysis, prior decisions, Janis
and Stone themselves, and the individual justices' opinions contained
within these cases will be examined in detail.
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Janis and Powell indicate
that the exclusionary rule will be subjected to increasing judicial scru-
tiny when controversies involving the rule are presented to the Court.
Basing its recent rulings on the degree of deterrence5 which might re-
sult from suppression of evidence under the facts,6 the Court suggested
that it no longer was going to adhere to an overly broad rule of ex-
clusion which failed to make any distinction in the circumstances in-
volved.7
1. 96 S. CL 3021 (1976).
2. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. References to the deterrent effect as "marginal" in United States v. Janis, 96
S. Ct. at 3032 and as "minimal" in Stone v. Powell, id. at 3052, suggest that the Court
is focusing on the degree of deterrence involved in each case.
6. The majority opinions in both Janis and Stone were careful to evaluate the
degree of deterrence according to the specific facts of each case. 96 S. Ct. at 3029;
id. at 3051-52.
7. In Mapp, the Supreme Court established a strict rule of exclusion whereby all
evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches and seizures was inadmissible at
trial. 367 U.S. at 655. The material element under the Mapp rule was the occurrence
1
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In Janis, the Court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule does not apply to a federal civil proceeding where evidence has
been obtained by state officers without federal participation. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun," included a lengthy dis-
cussion of the evidentiary rule which excludes at trial evidence obtained
by police9 in violation of the fourth amendment. 10 Finding that the
admissibility of evidence in a federal civil proceeding was not signifi-
cant enough to state police officers to encourage them to violate fourth
amendment rights,'1 the majority refused to extend the exclusionary
rule beyond the realm of criminal prosecutions. 2 The Court's holding
in Janis was clearly a limitation on the broad mandate of Mapp that
all evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was inad-
missible in court." According to Justice Brennan, this was part of the
Court's business of slow strangulation of the exclusionary rule.14
Contemporaneously with the Janis decision, the Supreme Court
also ruled in Stone that because the deterrent effect of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule was only minimal'5 in federal habeas cor-
pus review of state convictions, the rule's application was not justified
in such cases.'" Writing for a five-member majority,' 7 Justice Powell
of a fourth amendment violation, rather than the circumstances of the particular viola-
tion. Therefore, the fact that a mere technical infringement had occurred, or that good
faith police conduct had. been involved, was irrelevant in considering the suppression
of evidence under the Mapp doctrine.
8. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined Justice
Blackmun in his opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented.
9. The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by private parties
or foreign governments. 96 S. Ct. at 3033 n.31; Robson v. United States, 279 F. Supp.
631 (E.D. Pa.), vacated on other grounds, 404 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1968); Knoll Assocs.
Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F. Supp.
81 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
10. See Parts III & IV of the majority opinion, 96 S. Ct. at 3027-35.
11. Id. at 3034 n.35.
12. The Supreme Court has never applied the rule to exclude evidence from either
a state or federal civil proceeding. Id. at 3029. Although the Court specifically left
undetermined whether the exclusionary rule was applicable to a civil proceeding involv-
ig an intra-sovereign violation, id. at 3033 n.31, the Janis majority indicated doubt
as to whether the exclusionary rule is a substantial and efficient deterrent even in intra-
sovereign cases. See id. at 3032 & n.27.
13. 367 U.S. at 655. Although the Supreme Court had never previously applied
the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, 96 S. Ct. at 3029,
the all-encompassing language of Mapp did not preclude such an interpretation.
14. 96 S. Ct. at 3035 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 3052.
16. Id. at 3051-52.
17. Joining Justice Powell in the majority opinion in Stone were Justices Stewart,
Blckmun, Rehnquist and $teve4ns,
2
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stated that considerations of judicial integrity"" and deterrence of illegal
police conduct were outweighed both by the "windfall" afforded to a
guilty defendant in excluding the tainted evidence, where a prisoner's
search and seizure claim had already been given full and fair considera-
tion at trial and on direct review, and by the consequent generation of
disrespect for law and the administration of justice such exclusion
would engender.19
Considered together, Janis and Stone represent a new standard of
review for search and seizure claims outside of criminal cases on direct
review. In the past, the Mapp rule had mandated suppression of evi-
dence at trial whenever a fourth amendment violation had been found
to exist, regardless of the underlying circumstances. However, in Janis
and Stone, the Court applied a balancing test to determine whether the
rule's deterrence on police conduct outweighed the cost to society that
its application inflicts.20 This new judicial guideline is premised on the
idea that (1) the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
the frequency of illegal searches and seizures by police;2 and (2) that
the rule is merely remedial in nature and not a personal constitutional
right. 2  Thus, in order to invoke the rule in other than direct review
of a criminal proceeding, there must exist a significant likelihood,
under the facts of a particular case, that application of the rule will out-
18. First enunciated in Weeks, the "judicial integrity" rationale for the exclusionary
rule is that the admission of evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure amounts
to a judicial affirmation of a constitutional violation. 232 U.S. at 394. Whether or
not this ground for suppressing illegally obtained evidence has ever reached the constitu-
tional level is debatable. Compare United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974), with id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. 96 S. Ct. at 3050.
20. 96 S. Ct. at 3032; Id. at 3051-52.
21. 96 S. Ct. at 3028, 3033 n.34, 3034 n.35. Whether deterrence is the primary
reason for the exclusionary rule has been subject to much debate among members of
the Court. Despite the majority's finding in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-
37 (1965), that since Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), all of the cases which
required suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment were
based on deterrence, Justice Black stated:
I have read and reread the Mapp opinion but have been unable to find one
word in it to indicate that the exclusionary search and seizure rule should
be limited on the basis that it was intended to do nothing in the world except
to deter officers of the law.
381 U.S. at 649 (Black, J., dissenting). See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
355, 360 (1974) (Brennan, I., dissenting).
22. 96 S. Ct. at 3028; Id. at 3048, 3052 n.37; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974). Contra, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) where Justice
Black, in dissent, reasoned that if the exclusionary rule was not a right or privilege,
but rather punishment to police officers, the Court in establishing such a rule was really
"lawmaking" and not construing the Constitution. Id. at 649.
3
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weigh the costs to society resulting from the suppression of relevant
evidence.28
Upon close examination, the Janis and Stone opinions also provide
considerable insight concerning the views of the current members of
the Supreme Court toward the exclusionary rule in general. In Janis,
Justice Blackmun criticized the fact that the rule frustrates the entire
criminal process. 4 Through the use of extensive footnotes he listed
numerous articles on the subject of less costly alternatives to the rule26
and various empirical studies which have failed to prove that the rule
actually deters illegal police conduct. 21
Justice Powell also expressed dissatisfaction with the present
status of the exclusionary rule. In particular, he was concerned with
the wide disparity between the police error and the "windfall" afforded
a guilty defendant in some cases, since this difference is contrary to
the idea of proportionality, which is essential to the concept of justice.2 7
As a "sequel" to his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Federal Agents,25 Chief Justice Burger concurred with the majQrity's
decision in Stone in an opinion which attacked the very existence of
the exclusionary rule. Although finally admitting at the end of his
opinion that the rule could be kept for a small and limited category
of cases,29 the Chief Justice was adamant in criticizing what he de-
scribed as a doctrinaire result in search of validating reasons.30
Justice White dissented in Stone on the ground that, under the
present habeas corpus statute,3 Congress did not distinguish between
23. 96 S. Ct. at 3032. This is the same balancing test that the Court used in
earlier cases. See notes 100-103 infra and accompanying text.
24. Id. at 3029.
25. Id. at 3030 n.21.
26. Id. at 3030-31 n.22.
27. Id. at 3050. In a footnote, Justice Powell stated: "Many of the proposals for
modification of the scope of the exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role
of proportionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of establishing
a direct relationship between the nature of the violation and the decision whether to
invoke the rule." Id. at n.29.
28. 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger's dissenting opin-
ion in Bivens detailed the flaws of the exclusionary rule, id. at 411-20, and presented
an outline for a statutory scheme which would supplant the rule as a remedy to enforce
fourth amendment rights. Id. at 422-23.
29. 96 S. Ct. at 3052. Even in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger suggested that he
might settle for narrowing the rule, 403 U.S. at 424. But since the main bodies of
his opinions in Bivens and Stone were primarily devoted to criticism of the rule's exist-
ence in any form, such suggestions seem to be only a grudging compromise, and not
a true reflection of Burger's total dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rul.
30. 96 S. Ct. at 3053.
3 . 8 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970),
[Vol. 12:337
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cases alleging fourth amendment violations and those raising other con-
stitutional issues.3 2 However, he admitted that he opposed the present
scope of the exclusionary rule and would join other members of the
Court in substantially limiting its reach.3 3 Unlike Chief Justice Burger,
however, Justice White would overrule neither Weeks nor Mapp, but
would prohibit the rule's application to evidence obtained through
good-faith conduct.3 4
These critical statements by members of the Supreme Court to-
wards what has become, at least for the lower federal courts, a hard
and fast, all-encompassing rule of exclusion cannot be fully appreciated
without a review of the Supreme Court's development of this doctrine
of evidence suppression. The Court's present desire to reassess the
scope of the rule35 stems in large part from the manner in which the
rule was established.
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule had its inchoate origin
in Boyd v. United States 6 in 1886. In Boyd, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a congressional act which authorized a federal judge
32. 96 S. Ct. at 3071-72 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 3072.
34. Id. The searches and seizures in Weeks and Mapp did not involve a good
faith effort on the part of the police to observe fourth amendment rights. From an
earlier search of the defendant's home by state officials, the Federal Marshal in Weeks
was aware of probable cause to search, yet did not obtain a warrant for his later intru-
sion. 232 U.S. at 386. The police in Mapp attempted to gain entry into the defendant's
apartment by telling her they had a warrant for the search. Yet at trial no warrant
was produced and no reasons were advanced for the failure to obtain one. 367 U.S.
at 644-45. See note 87 infra and accompanying text. In both cases, the officials who
searched the defendants' homes had probable cause for a search well before their intru-
sion, but made no effort to fulfill the constitutional requirement of procuring a prior
warrant.
35. Neither the Janis nor Stone decisions should be surprising to those who have
read closely the Supreme Court's opinions during the October, 1976 Term. On five
different occasions during the months preceding July 6, 1976 the Court consistently
narrowed the application of the exclusionary rule in a variety of factual circumstances.
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (Dec. 1, 1975), involved the warrantless search of an
automobile in police custody; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (Jan. 26, 1976),
concerned a warrantless arrest by federal officers without exigent circumstances; United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (Apr. 21, 1976), involved the issue of whether microfilms
of checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to bank accounts came within the
confines of the fourth amendment; United States v. Santana, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (Jun. 24,
1976), concerned the issue of whether an open residential doorway constituted a "public
place"; and Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (June 29, 1976), involved the seizure
of business records.
36. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
1976]
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to order a defendant to produce an invoice on imported goods.8 7 Find-
ing that the judicial order constituted a search and seizure s and that
the papers ordered to be produced tended to incriminate the defend-
ant, the majority held that use of such evidence violated both the fourth
and fifth amendments.3 9 However, a close analysis of the majority
opinion reveals that the key to the decision was the finding that a fifth
amendment violation had occurred.40 It was only after this conclusion
had been reached that the majority held that the search and seizure
was consequently unreasonable.4'
The emphasis throughout the Boyd opinion was on equating com-
pelling a criminal defendant to produce incriminating private papers for
use at trial with requiring him to actually testify on the stand against
himself.42 The concurring opinion recognized this fifth amendment
basis for the decision, but rejected the argument that there had been
37. The order was made pursuant to Section 5 of the Act of June 22, 1874 ("An
Act to Amend the Customs Revenue Laws and to Repeal Moieties") which pertained
to all but criminal proceedings. 116 U.S. at 619. In pertinent part the Act read:[rf the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse to produce such book, in-
voice or paper in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated in the said
motion shall be taken as confessed . . . . And if produced the said[Government) attorney . . . may offer the same in evidence on behalf of the
United States.
Id. at 620. Although the original action in Boyd was instituted against "Thirty-five
Cases of Plate Glass," id. at 618, and a subpoena duces tecum could not have been
issued under the Act for criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court did not discuss the
issue of whether the issuance of the subpoena had been a violation of the authorizing
statute. Instead, the Court summarily found that the forfeiture came within the fifth
amendment prohibitions that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself," since suits for penalties and forfeitures are quasi-criminal
in nature. Id. at 634.
38. Id. at 621-22.
39. Id. at 634-35.
40. Differentiating between the search and seizure of items which are protected
by the fifth amendment and those which are not, the Court stated:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable toduties and concealed to avoid payment thereof, are totally different things from
a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose
of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence
against him. The two things differ tote coelo. In the one case, the govern-
ment is entitled to possession of the property; in the other it is not.
Id. at 623 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court separated solely search and seizure
violations from those intertwined with what amounted to compelled self-incrimination.
Since only the latter mandated suppression of evidence thereby obtained, it follows that
had books or papers not been involved in Boyd, that case would have had a different
result.
41. Id. at 633.
42. Comparing the two, the Court stated: "[We have been unable to perceive
that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against
him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself."
Id.
6
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an unreasonable search and seizure, since the statute in question re-
quired only that the defendant produce the papers, and not that he part
possession with them.43
Rather than being a forerunner of the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule, the Boyd decision was actually based on the interrelation-
ship between the fourth and fifth amendments, 4 and not on the notion
that the fourth amendment might, in and of itself, prohibit the use of
stolen or forfeited goods45 in a criminal trial. This conclusion that
Boyd did not establish a fourth amendment exclusionary rule was
reached by the Supreme Court in the 1904 case of Adams v. New
York,46 wherein Boyd was construed as pertaining only to cases in
which a defendant was virtually compelled to give testimony against
himself.47 In a unanimous opinion, the Court in Adams carefully noted
that the concurring Justices in Boyd had not found an unreasonable
search or seizure in that case.48  Without considering the applicability
of the fourth amendment to the states,4 9 the Adams Court found that
although private papers not subject to the issued warrant had been
seized,"0 their introduction in the resulting criminal trial did not violate
the fourth amendment,51 since it was unnecessary for courts to inquire
as to the means by which evidence was obtained.
52
In the subsequent case of Weeks v. United States,53 the Supreme
Court established what has become known as the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Day held that
43. In their concurrence, Justice Miller and Chief Justice Waite emphatically re-
fused to base the decision in Boyd on the fourth amendment:
Nothing in the nature of a search is here hinted at [in the challenged
statute]. Nor is there any seizure, because the party is not required at any
time to part with the custody of the papers. They are to be produced in
court, and, when produced, the United States attorney is permitted, under the
direction of the court, to make examination in presence of the claimant, and
may offer in evidence such entries in the books, invoices, or papers as relate
to the issue. The act is careful to say that "the owner of said books and
papers, his agent or attorney, shall have, subject to the order of the court,
the custody of them, except pending their examination in court as aforesaid."
Id. at 640.
44. Id. at 633.
45. Id. at 623.
46. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
47. Id. at 597-98.
48. Id. at 597.
49. Id. at 594.
50. The warrant specified only "policy slips" (tickets used in "numbers" games)
and did not cover the personal papers seized along with the slips. Id.
51. Id. at 597. It was further found that this did not amount to compulsory self-
incrimination as prohibited by the fifth amendment. Id.
52. Id. at 594.
53. 232U.S. 383 (1914).
1976]
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it was a violation of the fourth amendment for a federal judge to deny
a defendant's motion for return of letters and other private correspond-
ence, where they had been taken without a warrant by a United States
Marshal, who entered the defendant's residence with the intention of
obtaining evidence. "4 The Court chose to exclude these letters and
correspondence for two reasons: first, the denial of a motion to sup-
press evidence which had been obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment would in effect be a judicial sanctioning of unconstitutional
conduct;55 secondly, the protections of the fourth amendment would
have no value without the suppression of the evidence thus obtained. 0
Attempting to distinquish the facts from those in Adams, the
Court noted that the alleged violation in Adams amounted to an in-
cidental seizure made in the execution of a legal warrant 7 and there-
fore afforded no precedential authority for the factual situation in
Weeks, where there had been a direct fourth amendment violation. 9
Although clearly influenced by the blatancy of the violation before it,00
the Court established the exclusionary rule without making any dis-
tinctions between direct and incidental violations.
Justice Cardozo's opinion in People v. Defore60 illustrates that this
new federal doctrine" was not well-received by many state courts.
Writing for a unanimous New York Court of Appeals in 1926, he com-
mented on the far-reaching effects of the Weeks decision:
The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power through
overzeal or indiscretion to confer immunity upon an offender
for crimes the most flagitious. A room is searched against
the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the
place of discovery may not be proved, the other circum-
stances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with the
crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the
54. Id. at 389, 398.
55. Id. at 394. In later opinions, this reasoning was referred to as the "imperative
of judicial integrity." See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
56. 232 U.S. at 393.
57. Id. at 396.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 398.
60. Id. at 386. Although not expressly stated in the opinion, the Marshal's conduct
could not have been described as a good faith effort to comply with the search and
seizure requirements of the fourth amendment. See note 35 supra; see also note 89
infra and accompanying text.
61. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
62. The Court specifically limited the rule's application to conduct made under
claim of federal authority or made after the finding of a federal indictment. Id. at
39B.
[Vol. 12:337
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murderer goes free. Another search, once more against the
law, discloses counterfeit money or the implements of forgery.
The absence of a warrant means the freedom of the forger. 63
Like the majority of state courts at that time,64 the New York Court
of Appeals in Defore was unable to accede to the creation of an ex-
clusionary rule for a search and seizure statute, which, like the fourth
amendment, says nothing about the consequences."5
Thus, except where adopted by individual states 6 the Weeks doc-
trine was confined solely to conduct involving federal officials for sev-
eral decades. This limitation was reaffirmed in Wolf v. Colorado,67
where the Supreme Court held that although the fourth amendment
right against arbitrary intrusions was now applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, the same was not true of the ex-
clusionary rule. The Court's rationale was that the Weeks doctrine was
merely "a matter of judicial implication"' s and therefore was not de-
rived from the "explicit requirements"'6 9 of the fourth amendment.
Central to the Court's decision in Wolf was its reasoning that the ex-
clusionary rule could not be an essential ingredient of the right of due
process,70 because at that time the majority of states had not chosen
to adopt it.71
One year before the Mapp decision was handed down, the Su-
preme Court in Elkins v. United States72 overruled the "silver platter"
doctrine,73 which had previously allowed evidence obtained solely by
63. 242 N.Y. at 23-24, 150 N.E. at 588. In a frequently quoted phrase, Justice
Cardozo stated: "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Id.
at 21, 150 N.E. at 587.
64. By 1926, of forty-five other states which had been confronted with the decision
of adopting the Weeks exclusionary rule, thirty-one had rejected it. Id.
65. Id. at 22-24, 150 N.E. at 588.
66. For a list of states that adopted the Weeks doctrine prior to July 1949, see
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 38 (1949), Table I, section (b).
67. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
68. Id. at 28.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 29.
71. Id. at 29-30. The significance in the Court's decision that most states had not
accepted the exclusionary rule is illustrated by the six-page appendix (id. at 33-39)
to the majority opinion, wherein ten tables present an analysis of the consideration
of the Weeks doctrine by the states. Some of these tables list the position of states
towards the Weeks doctrine both before and after the Weeks decision was handed down.
Other tables list those states which had overruled or adhered to prior contrary decisions
after Weeks was decided. The Court was also influenced by the fact that most of
the English-speaking world did not have a comparable rule. Id. at 29-30.
72. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
73. The term "silver platter" originated in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74
(1949), where Justice Frankfurter wrote: "[A] search is a search by a federal official
1976]
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state agents in illegal searches and seizures to be admitted in federal
criminal trials. Perhaps as much influenced by a recent trend of the
states7 4 in adopting the exclusionary rule as by arguments about police
deterrence 75 and judicial integrity, 7 the majority invoked the Court's
supervisory power7 7 over federal courts in extending the Weeks doc-
trine to apply to state conduct in federal criminal prosecutions.
Two rather striking similarities appear in the majority opinions of
Wolf and Elkins. In neither case did the Court focus specifically on
the facts presented it. The fact situation in Wolf 8 was not given in
any of the justices' opinions. In Elkins, the only reference to the fac-
tual elements involved was at the beginning of the Court's opinion. 7a
Both Wolf and Elkins were decisions made in the abstract without any
special reference to the particular circumstances of the individual cases.
Further, as shown by the lengthy chronological appendices,80 both
if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by
state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." id. at
78-79.
74. 364 U.S. at 218-21. After the Wolf decision, North Carolina, Delaware and
California switched to the exclusionary rule and Rhode Island had also adopted it by
the time Elkins reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 219 & nn.12-13, 220 & n.14. The
appendix to the majority opinion in Elkins presents a state-by-state chronological view
of the adoption and rejection of the Weeks doctrine. Id. at 224-32. However, the
interpretation of this data varied from a slow, but unstoppable movement toward adop-
tion of the rule, id. at 219, to one-half of the states refusing to adhere to the Weeks
rule. Id. at 242 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 217-18.
76. Id. at 222-23.
77. The Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal courts in the area of admis-
sibility of evidence in criminal proceedings is derived from FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, which
states in pertinent part: "The admissibility of evidence ... shall be governed, except
when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience." (emphasis added). It was under the authority of Rule 26
that the Supreme Court in Elkins created the federal procedural rule prohibiting the
use of evidence obtained by a search or seizure conducted by either state or federal
officials in violation of the fourth amendment. Although this interpretation of the com-
mon law was influenced by reason, that is, arguments about judicial integrity and police
deterrence, the Court was most influenced by the experience of the states' trend toward
adoption of the exclusionary rule. This conclusion is derived from the fact that the
majority opinion in Elkins devoted less than two pages to the deterrence argument,
id. at 217-18, and only a single page to the judicial integrity rationale, id. at 222-23.
On the other hand, four full pages of the opinion's text, id. at 218-22, and an eight-
and-a-half page appendix, id. at 224-32, were devoted to detailing the experience of
the states in their movement toward adoption of the Weeks rule.
78. In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954), it was pointed out that Wolf
was decided in a vacuum without any reference to its facts.
79. 364 U.S. at 206-07.
80. 338 U.S. at 33-39; 364 U,S. at 224-32,
10
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opinions placed great emphasis on the attitude of the individual states
toward the exclusionary rule."'
This reliance upon evidence of state accept.nce of the exclu-
sionary rule and the failure of the Court to mold its decision to the facts
before it were again seen in the 1961 decision Mapp v. Ohio,8 2 where
the Supreme Court by a 4-2-3 vote substantially altered constitutional
law by holding that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in either a state
or federal court proceeding.8 3  Incensed by the "casual arrogance"8 4
exhibited by police in making a warrantless invasion of the defendant's
residence,85 four members of the Court88 chose to reverse the con-
viction and extend the Weeks doctrine to the states. However, this
plurality did not limit its holding to the "flagrant ' 8 7 violation in Map p,
8 8
but rather made the nondiscriminating evidentiary rule of the Weeks
case constitutionally applicable to the states.8 9
81. 338 U.S. at 29; 364 U.S. at 218-21.
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. Id. at 655.
84. Id. at 671 (Douglas, J., concurring).
85. Although the police waved a paper in front of the defendant which purportedly
was a warrant, there is considerable doubt as to whether a warrant for the search ever
existed. Id. at 668 n.2. See note 34 supra.
86. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas joined Justice Clark
in the plurality opinion.
87. 367 U.S. at 655. Justice Clark considered the following conduct of the police
in Mapp as flagrant: (1) the defendant's door was forcibly opened when she did not
answer the policemen's knock immediately, (2) after the defendant placed in her bosom
a purported search warrant, police physically retrieved it and handcuffed her for resist-
ing their rescue of the document, (3) without further justification a policeman grabbed
the defendant's hand and twisted it, causing her to plead with him because it hurt,
(4) although her attorney arrived while the police were at defendant's house, they refused
to let the attorney enter the house or see the defendant, and (5) no search warrant
was produced at trial and no explanation for its disappearance was given. Id. at 644-
45.
88. That Mapp was not limited to its facts, but rather was an all-encompassing
announcement of constitutional law, was illustrated in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721 (1969), wherein Justice Brennan stated: "[1In Mapp v. Ohio ...we held that
'all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court'." Id. at 724 (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted). Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for establishing an all-encompass-
ing rule was to put an end to the great controversy which followed the Wolf holding
of extending the substantive fourth amendment rights but not the exclusionary rule to
the states. See 367 U.S. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring).
89. The plurality in Mapp was more concerned with elevating the Weeks doctrine
to a position where it was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connect-
icut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), than it was with the result of the case before the
Court. This is borne out by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Mapp with which
two other members of the Court concurred. 367 U.S. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Terming the holding in Justice Clark's opinion as reaching out to overrule that portion
of Wolf which limited the constitutional application of the exclusionary rule to the fed-
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The Court gave many reasons for its finding in Mapp that the ex-
clusionary rule was an essential part of the fourteenth amendment right
of privacyf 0 Writing for the plurality, Justice Clark emphasized that
the deterrent aspect of the rule was necessary for the viability of the
right of privacy because the alternative remedies were ineffective.91
Although this rationale was bolstered by the judicial integrity argu-
ment9 and several other factors, 3 the plurality was probably most in-
fluenced by the changed attitude of the states towards the exclusionary
rule after the Wolf decision. Although in 1949 almost two-thirds of
the states opposed the use of the rule, by 1961 more than half of those
states which had subsequently passed upon it had either wholly or par-
tially adopted the Weeks holding, either by legislative enactment or
judicial decision. 94
PRESENT REASSESSMENT OF THE RULE
The foregoing analysis suggests two important conclusions. First,
the Supreme Court's evolution of the exclusionary rule was fashioned
more in a legislative than a judicial manner. Instead of limiting its
holding in Weeks and Mapp to the facts of each case, the Court an-
nounced an all-encompassing rule, as if drafting a piece of legislation. 5
eral government, id. at 674, Justice Harlan pointed out that re-examination of Wolf
had only been a subordinate issue in the appellant's brief and was neither argued therein
nor orally. Id. at 672, 674 nn.5-6.
90. 367 U.S. at 656.
91. Id. at 652. Only 23 of the then 48 states had criminal provisions relating di-
rectly to illegal searches and seizures. Of these states, two punished a magistrate for
issuing a warrant without a supporting affidavit, ten had provisions punishing police
officers who willfully exceeded the authority of a search warrant, eleven established
criminal liability of a police officer who searched either with an invalid warrant or
without a warrant and seventeen provided criminal sanctions for an affiant who mali-
ciously procured a search warrant (New York limited this liability to police officers).
Id. at 652 n.7. Trespass actions against police officers were mainly illusory. Id. at
670 (Douglas, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Clark was prompted to remark that the
Wolf holding had merely extended the right against unreasonable search and seizure
to the states, but had withheld the privilege and enjoyment of that right by failing
to make the exclusionary rule constitutional. Id. at 656.
92. Id. at 659.
93. These other considerations included the lack of a future need to reconcile seem-
ingly inconsistent decisions, id. at 658, the strict enforcement of federal standards on
the states for other amendments, id. at 656, and the unenduring effectiveness of short-
cuts in the history of criminal law, Id. at 658.
94. Id. at 651. But see Justice Harlan's dissent, pointing out that a recent survey
had indicated that one-half of the states still followed the common law non-exclusionary
rule and that Maryland retained the rule for felonies. Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
95. See note 90 supra. Flagrant fourth amendment violations on the part of police
were involved in both Mapp and Weeks. See note 35 supra. Had the Court limited
its holding to the bad faith intrusions in each case, the result of those decisions would
[Vol. 12:337
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Second, the exclusionary rule was not developed with the idea that the
degree of deterrence of illegal police conduct involved would guide the
Court in marking the boundaries of its applicability. Rather, other
factors, such as the trend of the states in adopting the rule as well as
the elusive "imperative of judicial integrity,"96 prevented the Supreme
Court, as well as lower federal and state courts, from molding a rule
based on the potential effect of exclusion to deter illegal police searches
and seizures under the facts of each case.
These two points are the primary reasons why some members of
the Supreme Court have begun to carefully reassess the scope of the
exclusionary rule. The majority hopes to avoid making a Mapp-like
decision which, instead of putting an end to a long-standing constitu-
tional controversy, 97 merely gives rise to a new one. 98  Part of the
Court's reevaluation of the exclusionary rule has been the development
of a balancing test to determine the limits of the Weeks and Mapp doc-
trines. Under this test, the rule is applied whenever the Court finds
the potential deterrence to illegal police conduct is greater than the
harm caused to society by the exclusion of relevant evidence. 9
In Walder v. United States,'00 the Supreme Court allowed a fed-
eral prosecutor to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach the cred-
ibility of a defendant who had perjured himself in his own defense. In
Linkletter v. Walker,'10 the Court specifically limited the application
of the Mapp doctrine when it refused to apply Mapp retroactively.
This was done primarily because no deterrent purpose would have been
served otherwise.' 0 2  Finally, in United States v. Calandra,0 3 the ex-
have remained the same-exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence. Thus, the ma-
jority in each instance established a rule of law created not to fit the facts before the
Court (a judicial function), but rather to solve the many enforcement problems pre-
sented by the fourth amendment (a legislative function).
96. Although in recent cases the Court has treated the question of whether the
admission of illegally obtained evidence encourages fourth amendment violations as es-
sentially the same one concerning whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose,
see notes 110-111 infra and accompanying text, these two inquiries were treated sep-
arately in earlier cases. See notes 55-56, 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
97. In his concurring opinion in Mapp, Justice Douglas characterized the Court's
holding in that case as bringing to an end a storm of constitutional controversy that
had raged since the Wolf decision. 367 U.S. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring).
98. The new controversy, which began with the Calandra holding that the exclusion-
ary rule was not applicable to grand jury proceedings, centers around the limits of the
Mapp doctrine.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52.
100. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
101. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
102. Id. at 636-37.
103. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
1976]
13
Harlan: Impending Frontal Assault on the Citadel: The Supreme Court's Rea
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
clusionary rule was found inapplicable to grand jury proceedings be-
cause the Court, through a balancing process, found the deterrent ef-
fect outweighed by the potential injury to the function of the grand jury.
Although this balancing test has been used before by the Court
to limit the application of the Weeks and Mapp doctrines, the resulting
limitations have only exempted certain areas, such as grand jury pro-
ceedings,"0 4 or made certain decisions of the Court prospective in ap-
plication." 5 The holdings of Janis and Stone do not represent a de-
parture from this trend, since Janis exempts civil proceedings involving
intersovereign violations and Stone exempts federal habeas corpus re-
view of state convictions from the exclusionary rule.
There has been no Supreme Court decision modifying the Weeks
and Mapp doctrines, so that this balancing test can: be applied generally
by lower courts in all cases. However, Janis and Stone do represent
a continuation of the trend to further limit a broadly applied exclu-
sionary rule.
Another indication that the Court is reassessing the role of the ex-
clusionary rule is the diminishing focus on the judicial integrity ration-
ale. Beginning with Weeks, the imperative of judicial integrity became
one of the Court's primary reasons for justifying the rule's existence.
However, an abrupt change occurred in 1974 when the majority opin-
ion in Calandra failed to mention judicial integrity. This omission was
especially noticeable because judicial integrity was the thrust of Justice
Brennan's dissent in that case.10 6 The concept reemerged, however,
in United States v. Peltier,10 7 where Justice Rehnquist pointed out that
judicial integrity was not offended by a fourth amendment violation if
it was the result of good faith police conduct. 08 Although Justice
Brennan argued in his dissenting opinion that Peltier had merged to-
gether the judicial integrity and deterrent purpose rationales, 10 9 it was
not until Janis that the majority stated that the foci of the two were
essentially the same." 0 In Stone, Justice Powell stated that the con-
cem over preserving judicial integrity has limited force where the ex-
104. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 101 supra and accompanying text. See also note 125 infra and ac-
companying text.
106. In reaction to the Court's failure to mention judicial integrity, Justice Brennan
stated: "For the first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the
vital function of the rule to insure that the judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance
of sanctioning illegal government conduct." 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
108. id. at 537-38.
109. Id. at 553-54 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. 96 S. Ct. at 3034 n.35.
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clusion of highly probative evidence is sought.:"' Thus, it appears that
judicial integrity has been relegated to a secondary position in the
Court's current search for the proper scope of the exclusionary rule.
The importance of this displacement of judicial integrity by the
concept of deterrence is found in Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandra.
He argued that the imperative of judicial integrity mandated no limita-
tions on the Mapp rule to eliminate even the slightest appearance that
a court was sanctioning unconstitutional conduct.112 By disposing of
judicial integrity as a separate focal point in reassessing the limits of
Mapp, the Court has also eliminated from consideration the attendant
argument that the scope of the exclusionary rule should be all-encom-
passing.
Finally, the dicta in Janis and Stone criticizing the present status
of the exclusionary rule indicate that a majority of the present members
of the Court are no longer satisfied with the Weeks and Mapp doctrines
as they are currently administered. In obvious response to Justice
Brennan's dissenting argument in Stone, 1 3 Justice Blackmun reem-
phasized in Janis, as did Justice Powell in Stone, the Calandra holding
that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but
rather a remedial device based on the potential deterrence of future
unlawful police conduct."' Justice Blackmun pointed out that despite
numerous empirical studies to determine whether the rule actually de-
ters fourth amendment violations, each seemed to be flawed."I5 He
also posited the view that the exclusionary rule encourages police to
lie in court to avoid suppression of evidence" 6 and that police often
do not consider trial and conviction an important aspect of law enforce-
ment. 1 7 Although no position was taken by the Court on these argu-
ments, their placement in a majority opinion gives credence to the be-
lief that the Court is reconsidering the scope of the exclusionary rule.""
THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD
How will the Supreme Court alter the Mapp doctrine, assuming
111. 96 S. Ct. at 3047.
112. 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. 96 S. Ct. at 3059 & n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. 96 S. Ct. at 3028-29; Id. at 3048.
115. 96 S. Ct. at 3030.
116. Id. at 3029 n.18.
117. Id. at n.20.
118. One federal district judge has even stated that Janis emphasizes that the Su-
preme Court is in doubt as to the application of the exclusionary rule to criminal cases.
Ekelund v. Secretary of Commerce, 418 F. Supp. 102, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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it is on the verge of doing so? In Weeks and Mapp the Court was
confronted by blatant violations of the fourth amendment. In neither
instance was a warrant obtained by the intruding officers, even though
there had been more than sufficient time to obtain one; in fact, there
was no suggestion in either case that the officers had even attempted
to comply with the requirements of the fourth amendment. Had the
Court not required suppression of the evidence seized in each instance,
its decision, in effect, would have condoned the officers' arrogant neg-
lect"19 of a constitutional right.
Not all search and seizure violations are made in bad faith. Some
involve technical defects which even the most conscientious and cap-
able law enforcement officer might overlook. This was exactly the sit-
uation involved in Janis where Justice Blackmun pointed out that the
affidavit bore some similarity to the affidavit the Court later considered
and found deficient by a 5-3 margin in Spinelli v. United States.120 Be-
cause of this, Blackmun classified the unlawful search and seizure as
having been made in good faith reliance on a warrant which was later
proven defective.'
Although unnecessary"' to the outcome in Janis, Justice Black-
mun reiterated several times in his opinion that a good faith violation
was involved.' 23 He also thought it worthy to twice note that good faith
significantly reduces the potential deterrent effect of exclusion. 124 In
Stone, Justice Powell pointed out that good faith conduct on the part
of the law enforcement officers in Peltier was part of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in that case not to hold retroactive an earlier decision
concerning the substantive requirements of the fourth amendment. 29
119. Justice Douglas described the police conduct as "casual arrogance" in his con-
curring opinion in Mapp. 367 U.S. 671 (Douglas, J., concurring).
120. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The affidavit involved in Janis was issued two months
before Spinelli was decided. See 96 S. Ct. at 3023 n.2.
121. Id. at 3029. Although not stated by the Court, the facts in Stone involved
a search and seizure conducted by police in a good faith belief that the probable cause
for the search (the arrest) was based on a valid vagrancy ordinance. It was only later
that the Supreme Court held a similar ordinance unconstitutional. See note 134 infra.
122. See notes 130-33 infra and accompanying text. Janis was based on the reason-
ing that since there is not a substantial likelihood of deterring illegal police fourth
amendment intrusions by refusing to admit in a federal civil proceeding evidence unlaw-
fully obtained by state officials, the societal costs of exclusion outweigh the minimal
deterrent effect. 96 S. Ct. at 3032. Therefore, the fact that the search and seizure
violation in Janis was made by police in a good faith effort to comply with the Consti-
tution merely buttressed the final outcome of the case. See note 133 infra and accom-
panying text.
123. 96 S. CL at 3023, 3029, 3034 n.35.
124. Id. at 3032 n.28, 3034 n.35.
125. 96 S. Ct. at 3047-48 n.23.
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Both Justices Blackmun and Powell indicated in footnotes what Justice
White openly stated in his dissenting opinion in Stone: The scope of
the exclusionary rule should be modified to exclude violations by police
acting in a reasonable, good faith belief that their conduct comports
with existing law.126
These Justices are not alone in their desire for change. In Stone,
Chief Justice Burger deplored the suppression of evidence in cases in-
volving good faith mistakes by policemen or where purely technical de-
ficiencies in search warrants were involved.127  Justice Rehnquist, who
wrote the majority opinion in Peltier, also placed great emphasis on the
fact that no deterrent purpose is served where good faith conduct is in-
volved. 128  It is arguable, therefore, that a majority of the present
members of the Supreme Court advocate some good-faith exception to
the Mapp doctrine.
Although only alluded to in Stone,129 the importance placed on
good faith conduct by the majority in Janis was quite apparent. In fact,
Justice Blackmun included a reference to the element of good faith in
framing the issue presented by the case.'30 Twice thereafter Black-
mun pointed out that good faith conduct on the part of police substan-
tially reduces the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. 3' Despite
these statements, the factor of good faith was missing in the Court's
holding.1 2  It was, however, a secondary reason given by the Court
for its decision, since the last footnote of the case states that the fact
that the officers acted in good faith was an additional reason for the
Court's ruling.'33
References concerning good faith in these recent decisions are not
incidental. They appear too frequently in Janis not to have been
placed there intentionally.
126. Id. at 3072 (White, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 3054 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
128. 422 U.S. at 538.
129. 96 S. Ct. at 3047-48 n.23.
130. 96 S. Ct. at 3023. This issue was also restated in Part IV of the Court's opin-
ion. Id. at 3029.
131. Id. at 3032 n.28, 3034 n.35.
132. Justice Blackmun stated the Court's holding in Janis as follows:
[We conclude that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence un-
lawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown
to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so
that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion. This Court,
therefore, is not justified in so extending the exclusionary rule.
Id. at 3032 (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 3034 n.35.
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Why, however, if the facts of Janis included the element of good
faith police conduct, did the Court not make good faith an express part
of its holding?' It is probable that some members of the majority
desired to limit the opinion as much as possible, to avoid a broader rul-
ing than was necessary to achieve the desired result in the Janis case.
Instead of creating a good faith exception, which would have been a
direct modification of Mapp, s5 the Court chose only to exempt from
the exclusionary rule an area the Court had never actually held came
within the Mapp doctrine.'" 6
It is also possible that other members of the Janis majority, such
as Justice White,' - 7 advocated a good faith standard but were unable
to secure majority support for that position. It is, therefore, conceivable
that as a compromise, the Janis majority agreed among themselves not
to establish a broader than necessary holding and only to make refer-
ences to the Court's disposition for such an exception. These state-
ments would signal the lower courts to begin applying a good faith
standard. Additionally, these references to good faith could have been
intended as groundwork to provide precedent for a future opinion
creating an exception for good faith conduct.
134. This question might also be asked about Stone, since its facts involved a search
and seizure violation by police who acted in a good faith belief that the ordinance
the defendant had violated in their presence was constitutional. 96 S. Ct. 3039-40.
See id. at 3073 (White, J., dissenting). It was not until the case reached the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit almost seven years later that the ordinance for which
the defendant initially had been arrested was held to be unconstitutional, based on a
similarly vague vagrancy ordinance which the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional
in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), four years after the arrest
of the defendant in Stone. The murder weapon, obtained by searching the defendant
after his arrest on the vagrancy charge, was held by the Ninth Circuit to be subject
to the exclusionary rule, despite the fact that at the time the defendant was arrested,
the vagrancy ordinance had complied with all existing Supreme Court rulings. Thus,
the conduct of the police in Stone was similar to that of the police in Janis, where
the Supreme Court classified their actions as made in a good faith belief that the search
and seizure of the defendant comported with the requirements of the fourth amendment.
96 S. Ct. at 3034 n.35. See id. at 3023 n.1.
Unlike Janis, Stone also involved a collateral issue-the scope of federal habeas
corpus review. 96 S. Ct. at 3039. This factor alone was probably sufficient for the
Court to ignore the possible broader good faith holding. Also, Stone was consolidated
with Wolff v. Rice, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), a case where the search warrant's technical
defect could not be classified as having been made in reasonable good faith. Id. at
3040-41. Additionally, Justice White, the only member of the Janis majority besides
the Chief Justice to openly advocate a good faith exception, id. at 3072, did not join
the Stone majority opinion, but rather dissented on habeas corpus grounds. Id. at 3071-
72 (White, J., dissenting).
135. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
136. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
137. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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This desire for a good faith standard should not be surprising.
With the Court's gradual elimination of the judicial integrity ration-
ale, 38 deterrence has emerged as the sole criterion upon which applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule is founded.'3 9 As stated in Peltier, good
faith conduct is a factor in measuring the degree of deterrence which
will likely result from a given decision.' 40
By establishing a good faith exception, the Court can do nothing
more than characterize good faith as a per se limitation on the Mapp
doctrine. This change conforms with Justice Blackmun's statement in
Janis that good faith conduct significantly reduces the deterrent effect
of exclusion.' 4' Further, it would reflect Justice Powell's comment in
Stone that not even judicial integrity is offended by the admission of
evidence obtained by officials acting in a good faith belief that their
conduct comported with the fourth amendment, even though subse-
quent case law held such conduct nonpermissible. 42  In effect, the
Court would be narrowing the issue in many cases from an inquiry into
whether deterrence of unlawful conduct is likely to result to whether
the police acted in good faith at the time the fourth amendment viola-
tion was committed.
CONCLUSION
Janis and Stone may appear to merely continue the Supreme
Court's trend of reducing, by use of a balancing test, the areas to which
the strict exclusionary rule of Mapp is applicable. 43 But underlying
these recent opinions is a desire by the majority to carve out an except-
ion to the Mapp doctrine which can be applied by lower courts under
all circumstances, rather than only in those areas where the Court has
previously ruled that the balancing test is to be used. This exception,
only alluded to in Stone14 4 but brought out more clearly in Janis,145 is
based on the idea that suppression of evidence unlawfully obtained
serves no deterrent purpose where police acted in a reasonable good faith
belief that their conduct complied with the fourth amendment. 46
138. See notes 106-11 supra and accompanying text.
139. 96 S. Ct. at 3028.
140. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
141. 96 S. Ct. at 3034 n.35.
142. 96 S. Ct. at 3047-48 n.23.
143. See notes 99-105 supra and accompanying text.
144. 96 S. Ct. at 3047-48 n.23.
145. See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
146. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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The reluctance of the Court to apply such a good faith standard
to the Janis facts is probably due to the desire of some members of
the majority to carefully limit their decisions and to avoid unnecessarily
broad rulings. 14 7 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger and Justice White
have openly advocated a good faith exception. 148 With their lead, and
with the remainder of the majority leaning in that direction, it appears
to be only a matter of time'49 until the strict exclusionary rule of the
fourth amendment is modified to exempt from its application evidence
obtained by police acting in a good faith belief that their conduct com-
ported with the requirements of the fourth amendment.
John L. Harlan
147. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
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